Interview with John A. Linehan Jr.

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR JOHN A. LINEHAN, JR.

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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Today is April 6, 1993. This is an interview with Ambassador John A. Linehan, Jr., on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: First off, could you give me a little about your background—when and where you were born and a bit about your upbringing and education?

LINEHAN: I was born in Gloucester, Massachusetts—Cape Ann in northeastern Massachusetts and went through the public schools there. After finishing high school I went to the College of Liberal Arts of Boston University for a year. But this was wartime.

Q: You were born in 1924?

LINEHAN: That's right [on July 20, 1924]. So in May, 1943, I went into the service. When I was being sworn in, or shortly thereafter, they said, “You—medic.” OK, thought, I'll be a medic. I went to Camp Pickett, VA, for basic training and then to Ft. Benjamin Harrison in Indianapolis for training as a surgical technician. I went to England in November, 1943. After two months in England I was sent to Northern Ireland for a couple of months, returning to England in April, 1944. We were told that we'd be moving out on the night of June 5, 1944. Of course, that was the night before the invasion. I've never forgotten seeing

a large number of airplanes flying over us with their lights on, an extraordinary sight. So we moved to Cornwall and went aboard ship. I landed in France on D+5—D-Day Plus Five [June 11, 1944]. I went through the French campaign and the Battle of the Bulge.

Q: You were with a hospital?

LINEHAN: A battalion aid station with a replacement battalion, attached to VII Corps. When the war ended, I was in Halle, near Leipzig, in Germany. I was discharged on December 3, 1945 and started back in college at Boston University in January, 1946. I graduated in June, 1948.

Q: What were you majoring in?

LINEHAN: Government. In the meantime, a week after I was discharged from the service in December, 1945, I went to call on one of my girlfriends, who was at Radcliffe. She invited me to the Christmas Dance. One thing led to another, and we were married in September, 1948.

I then went to Georgetown University, to the School of Foreign Service. My intention had been to get a master's degree here at Georgetown. The university catalogue said at that time that before you could take your master's degree, you had to get a Georgetown bachelor's degree, even though you had one, a process which would normally take a year. About two-thirds of the way through the year it turned out that getting another bachelor's degree would normally take two years. To put it mildly, this annoyed me and a number of my veteran colleagues, who also already had a degree. We made a fuss with the Veterans Administration and, as a result, Georgetown University agreed that, if we went through the summer session, we would get our bachelors' degrees in September [1949]. So I did that, but at that point I was fed up with Georgetown and had no intention of staying any longer.

Q: I might mention that this interview is taking place at Georgetown University. I have a place here but I'm not a part of Georgetown University.

LINEHAN: Well, I ended up with two bachelor's degrees. Then I did various things. Briefly, I worked for the Veterans' Administration and finally got myself a job as a clerk in the Department of State [November, 1950] with the Office of the Adviser on DP's [Displaced Persons] and Refugees, in what was then called the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. During this period I took the Foreign Service exam. I passed the written and then the oral exam in July, 1952. I entered the Foreign Service in September, 1952. For my sins my wife and I, as well as our five-month old son, were posted to Paris.

Q: Well, let me first ask what the training was like when you entered the Foreign Service in 1952?

LINEHAN: We had a three-month Basic Course which was, shall we say, reasonably minimal. There were some good lectures and some good teachers. The language training was pretty appalling. As I recall, we used Army language training books. My wife was allowed to come in for an hour a day, as I recall, which made life a little complicated because we had a new baby. She would drive in with the baby late in the day—about 4:00 PM. I'd drive home with the baby, and she'd get an hour of instruction. She finally learned to say—very nicely—that there are 365 days of sun a year in California. She could rattle it off, but that was about it. One of the problems of the course was that many of us were supposed to be going into consular work. That was the time when the McCarran Act on immigration and security [Internal Security Act of 1950] had just been passed, and there was no real background knowledge on it.

We left Washington and arrived in Paris, where we were not met on arrival. The next day I called on the consul general, having been assigned to the Visa Section. He was Freddy Lyon, a very nice person, whose wife, a lovely lady, I still see occasionally. He said, “I don't know whether you have a private income or not. But if you don't, you'll find it very difficult to live in Paris.” I went home and told my wife, “Maybe we should just go back to the U. S. and forget it.” But we didn't.

Q: Could you talk a little bit about the visa work you were doing there?

LINEHAN: It was rather interesting because I arrived in Paris in January, 1953. That was just before the inauguration of President Eisenhower, bringing the Republicans in after many years of Democratic administrations. They decided to improve and streamline things. Among other things they sent a team to Paris which decided that the Visa Section could be reduced in size from 66 employees—most of whom were French, of course—to 26. This was a major change. I might add that at that time the consul general, who was in charge of the whole Consular Section, and I, who was at the bottom, were the only Foreign Service Officers. The others were Foreign Service Staff Officers, about 22 of them.

We never quite achieved the level of 26 employees in the Visa Section because the Ambassador discovered, not too long after, that some of his French business friends had to wait as much as two weeks to get a visa for the States. We had to do something to improve that situation. There were many problems which came up, and people demanded to see the consul. Two of us were assigned to handle this problem. One was the officer in charge of security problems (French Communists, or whatever). I was the other who was appointed to play the role of the consul. You know, I was pretty new but when people demanded to see the consul, they saw me. The reason that the two of us had those jobs was that we spoke French, which few of the staff officers did.

That was a great job. I met all kinds of people. I issued visas to Christian Dior; to Elsa Schiaparelli, who was a famous hatmaker; and to Barbara Hutton, the Woolworth heiress, among others.

Q: Hadn't Barbara Hutton lost her citizenship?

LINEHAN: She'd given it up. She was carrying a Danish passport. I should tell you that after I'd been at post two weeks, my boss called me in and said, “OK, I guess it's time for you to start issuing visas. You can issue one today.” I said, “What am I going to do?” He

said, “Well, you have a business visa applicant. He has an appointment. You come in and talk with him and see if you feel that he's a bona fide visitor.” So the guy came in. He was not too tall and rather swarthy looking. He had an Argentine passport. We chatted. He seemed legitimate to me. So I issued him the visa. Well, a few days later my boss called me in and said, “You know that first visa you issued? Well, you signed the visa stamp in the passport but you forgot to sign the form that goes along with it.” So Mr. Onassis had to come all the way back from Nice to Paris to have this corrected. I didn't have a clue who Aristotle Onassis was but I found out quickly enough. That was the first visa I ever issued.

Anyway, I handled all kinds of visas for two years, both immigrant and non- immigrant. Then I spent about eight months handling passports with a woman who was rather famous at the time—Agnes Schneider. “The lady with the blue hair,” as she was called.

Q: She was sort of the doyenne of the Consulate in Paris. She was there for many years.

LINEHAN: Correct. I met a lot of people in the passport section whom I enjoyed meeting. My favorite was Olivia De Haviland, the actress, who had married a Frenchman and had a son named Mark, the same as my son's name. We compared notes about the difficulties of dealing with French pediatricians. Then I did general consular work. Certainly, I had a good grounding in consular activities. When the consul in charge of other consular duties, consular invoices, deaths, estates, and what have you, went on leave, I replaced him. He, by the way—if Agnes Schneider was the doyenne—was the doyen of the male officers, having been there since he got out of the U. S. Army in 1919. Except for two years, he was still there in 1956. Anyway, that office had been working on an agreement with the French Government under which the French gave us the title to our World War II cemeteries located in France. They had done so earlier for our World War I cemeteries. When the day came to sign the treaty, since I was in that office at the time, I went with Ambassador Douglas Dillon to the Quai d'Orsay [French Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. He was a stiff, not very communicative type. But on the way he said to me, “What are we doing today?” I explained to him that he was going to sign this particular agreement with the French.

When we arrived at the Quai d'Orsay, I was interested to see the way he turned on the charm. We went up to the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, then Christian Pineau. The Ambassador introduced me, and the Minister turned to his aide and asked, “Qu'est-ce qu'on va faire aujourd'hui?” [What are we going to do today?]. I thought to myself, “Aha. This is how high diplomacy is carried on.” [Laughter] We signed the agreement and all was well.

Q: What was the atmosphere in the Embassy at the time?

LINEHAN: It was an enormous Embassy. I think that, at the time, it was probably our largest Embassy in the world. To give you an example, there were four Americans in Paris with the rank of Ambassador: to France, NATO, the Marshall Plan, and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. In addition, there were two ministers, about 11 first secretaries, 22 second secretaries, but only one third secretary —me. I was the only one with that title. If you were down at the bottom, as I was, you led your own life. We had very little to do with the diplomatic community.

Q: While you were doing the consular work, do you have any feel for the political situation at the time? What was happening?

LINEHAN: In 1954 the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. As was typical of French politics at that time, there were frequent changes of government and a great deal of political unrest, if you want to call it that. This was also the time of the conviction and execution of the Rosenberg's in the United States.

Q: You're referring to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were convicted of passing nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union, a cause celebre around the world, particularly for the political Left, which was very critical of the United States.

LINEHAN: That's right. We had found a house after some difficulty—housing was hard to find in France at the time—in the suburban town of Nanterre, which also was known

as a Communist working class town. First of all, when Joe Stalin died in 1953, the town was draped in mourning. Secondly, when the Rosenberg's were executed, there were posters all over the place, with President Eisenhower pictured with teeth in the shape of the electric chairs. I have to say, however, that nobody ever bothered us in that town. We stayed there until May, 1956. I've never forgotten the little merchants around town who sold us bread, wine—whatever. They had never said anything more than “Good morning” or “Good afternoon.” All of a sudden, they were saying, “Are you leaving us?”—as if it were a real tragedy. When we stopped at the store of the lady who sold wine—the marchand de vin—she said that she was sorry that we were leaving and asked where we were going. I said that we were going to Quebec, Canada, very near where we come from in the United States. She said, in true French fashion, “But it's so far from Paris.”

Q: What was our view at the time of the Soviets and the French Communist Party?

LINEHAN: To give you a bit of the atmosphere, my wife went to the gate of our house one day. Somebody was soliciting contributions for something that sounded pretty legitimate. It turned out that she had made a contribution to a quasi-communist women's affair. Of course, I had a big fit about that. In the atmosphere of the time anything to do with communist organizations was something we were all afraid of. It was, after all, the time of Senator Joe McCarthy, a “Red Scare” period. The Soviets were regarded as the enemy. The French Communists, or communist organizations, or quasi-communist organizations were things that we were concerned about. That's why we had an officer [in the Visa Section] who dealt solely with this problem.

Q: Did you feel—perhaps not you particularly—but did the Embassy feel any of the heat of McCarthyism at all?

LINEHAN: Only indirectly. While I was in Paris, we had a visit from a fellow named Roy Cohn, who had a partner named David Schine. They made a visit. They objected, as I recall, to some of the American magazines we had on display for visitors in the Embassy

waiting rooms. This was pretty stupid, I thought, but it was that sort of thing. But I did not feel any heat directly.

Q: I recall Cohn and Schine's visit to Europe. It was just awful. Here were two—to use modern terminology—"gay" boys bouncing around, spoiled brats, having a wonderful time. And everyone was kowtowing to them.

LINEHAN: And accusing people right and left of things that simply weren't real.

Q: They were very nasty people.

LINEHAN: Well, it was the time, and I'm sure that you remember, that you wouldn't be caught dead wearing a pink shirt or a pink tie.

Q: Of course, people nowadays do that right and left. Even wear lavender. Well, at that time did anyone talk about De Gaulle, or was he just sort of a presence over the horizon?

LINEHAN: He was very much a presence in France, but still, at that time, in seclusion. We had a very happy relationship with our landlady, from whom we rented our house, and her family. We saw each other regularly. In part this was because we paid the rent in cash, because they were getting more money than they were supposed to get [under the rent control system]. So usually we went to their house at the end of the month for "une soiree" or they'd come to our house. I've never forgotten the husband saying—he was director of the storage and refrigeration section of the famous French fur company, Revillons Freres. He said, "We need a strong man. We need to get rid of this constant bickering and change." I must say that I was quite surprised at the strength of his remark. Consequently, it didn't surprise me particularly when De Gaulle came in.

Q: Well, then, you went to Quebec. You were there from 1956 to 1958.

LINEHAN: That was a quiet post, a delightful post. I might say that the French in France were difficult to get to know. French businessmen entertained in restaurants. They very

rarely entertained at home. On the other hand, once you made a French friend, you had a friend for life. We did have a few. We were very interested to find that the French Canadians were totally different—much warmer and more hospitable. We thoroughly enjoyed our time there because of that. They were just more open types. Now, the French language spoken in Quebec is a little bit different from that spoken in France. French Canadians have preserved some old terms. They've been heavily influenced by English over the radio and now television.

After two years in French Canada I returned to Washington at the time the Department had instituted language testing. I went, with some trepidation, to my language test, which was conducted by Marie-Louise something or other from Paris and an American who was bilingual. I walked into the room and said that I had just come from Quebec and asked whether either one of them had ever been to French Canada. Well, no, they hadn't. My heart sank, because I knew that I would say something in Canadian French. So instead I said, “Well, it really is very curious. The French Canadians say this, they say that, and the other.” And the two of them were saying, “Mais, c'est impossible, incroyable!” [But that's impossible, unbelievable!] I ran out of steam after about 15 minutes, and they said, “Thank you very much.”

Q: Which is called taking command of the situation.

LINEHAN: It was sort of a desperate attempt, I might say.

Q: But it worked.

LINEHAN: We had a happy time in Quebec. Nothing very exciting. At that time it was a two man post, with four French Canadian female employees. When I arrived, the consul was George Renchard, who became somewhat famous in the Foreign Service because after he retired, he was appointed an ambassador, presumably because his wife made a very large contribution to the president at that time. He left soon after I arrived, according to schedule. However, he was replaced by an “integrated” officer [i.e., who had not originally

been a Foreign Service Officer] who had also been in Paris but in NATO Affairs, in USRO [United States Regional Office], you might say. He didn't know anything about consular affairs, much less about general Foreign Service matters. So the following year, when he did my efficiency report, he said that he had figured he could learn all about visas and passports in about three weeks. He added, “I'm still ignorant, but nobody has complained, so Linehan must be OK.” I really enjoyed Quebec.

Q: Tell me, did you get any feel for the seeds of separatism? Were we playing with that at all?

LINEHAN: No. Those were the days of a man whom many people called a dictator, Maurice Duplessis, the Premier of Quebec. He ran things with an iron hand.

The Catholic Church was very important in those days [1956-1958]. There was very little opposition in Quebec. The only opposition that I'm aware of, however, was a religious order—I must admit that my knowledge of Catholic orders is not very good. There was an order, composed, I think, mainly of Benedictines, who ran an institution of some kind. They would write and publish things in opposition to the Duplessis Government. But that was about it. This was still a place where people were church-going, where French Canadians had very large families, and where the long-established English families in Quebec City ran the show commercially and financially. The only thing that I saw which gave some indication of what might happen in the future was that many of the people who were of my generation, who were English and running businesses, were also bilingual, although their parents were not. I belonged to an informal group which met once a week with business people—some French but mostly English speaking Canadians, I should say. The whole problem of separatism and what has happened in terms of the use of the English and French languages in the province, has changed drastically since my time.

Q: How did they feel about the United States?

LINEHAN: I think that it was better to be an American in Quebec City than to be an [English-speaking] Canadian from Ontario. In part this was because almost all French Canadians have relatives in the States. There was a lot of crossing the border, back and forth. Americans were very well appreciated there. I certainly felt very welcome during all of my time there.

Q: Then you came back to Washington.

LINEHAN: Yes, that was at the time [1958] of the integration of civil service employees into the Foreign Service, as you may recall.

Q: The Wriston Program, named after Henry Wriston [former Dean of Brown College].

LINEHAN: I was assigned to Personnel.

Q: This was from 1958 to 1962, wasn't it?

LINEHAN: 1958 to 1960. I was shocked at all of this. I felt that I hadn't entered the Foreign Service to be a Personnel Officer. In fact, what happened was that I replaced a civil service employee who was integrated into the Foreign Service and went off to do his thing abroad. What was happening, of course, was that instead of having civil servants assigning Foreign Service Officers, it became Foreign Service Officers assigning Foreign Service Officers. I replaced a civil servant, who was earning more money than I. Much to my surprise, the Department decided that I would be paid what he had been receiving.

Q: Yes, there was a regular thing about it. At more senior levels we gave up this differential, just to show that we were good guys.

LINEHAN: Well, I made $8,000 a year! That was something. Having started in the Foreign Service at an annual salary of $4793, as I recall, that was really great.

Q: Well, what were you doing in Personnel?

LINEHAN: I was assigned to the Personnel Operations Division, Far East Branch, and became one of about five or six officers handling assignments of personnel to the Far East. The office which handled most of the officer assignments, or Panel A, as it was called, met twice a week. These meetings were attended by our director. The rest of us, as I recall, handled assignments of people other than officers, which was called Panel B. There was subsequently a lot of criticism of that way of making assignments. Nowadays, of course, it's a case of “bidding” on jobs and all the rest. To my mind this newer system is not necessarily better. Anyway, I'm not so sure that the way we did it was so bad. I remember that we would assign people on the basis of what we thought was best, in terms of their record and what have you. Sometimes there would be people who would protest. I remember one protest which we thought was pretty legitimate. We assigned a secretary to Brazil from the States. Just a few months before she had bought herself a bright, red car. Well, in Brazil you can't have a bright, red car. Only the firemen can have bright, red cars, at least it was so at that time. She had spent a lot of money on this car and she wanted to go some place where she could take her car with her. We thought, “Well, that's perfectly legitimate,” so we changed her assignment.

Q: You mentioned a secretary. This was about 1958-1960. Could you give me some feeling about the secretarial corps, you might say. Where were they from and what was your impression of them at the time?

LINEHAN: I had and still have a very high regard for secretaries in the Foreign Service. Personally, I've been blessed with wonderful secretaries. Most of the people I've seen I've been impressed with. As you know, we recruit, on our own behalf, for the Foreign Service, not the civil service. At that time—I'm not sure what happens now—there were higher requirements, if you please, in terms of stenography. All secretaries had to pass a stenographic test, take dictation, and so on. In this day and age of computers, I'm not

sure what happens or what is required. I certainly hope that stenography is not required, because they are not going to use it.

As an aside, let me tell you that when I went to Paris, as I mentioned earlier, we were not met. We just got word to go to a particular hotel, where we had reservations. We were pretty much ignored. People were not particularly friendly, and so on. But there was one secretary in the Consular Section who was concerned about us. She lent us a radio. We didn't have such with us. She entertained us and sort of “mothered” us, shall we say. I've never forgotten what this meant. It mattered a tremendous amount to us. That is the sort of thing I've seen in the Foreign Service. I thought, and I still do, that we've had some absolutely first class people.

Q: Then what did you do from 1960 to 1962?

LINEHAN: I was junior desk officer for Indonesia.

Q: You were obviously drawing on your great experience in Indonesian affairs.

LINEHAN: Well, I had been assigning people to the Far East, so I guess that was the connection. This was a great experience. I really enjoyed that. I worked for a fellow who had been integrated into the Foreign Service, a very nice guy named Bob Lindquist, a Chinese language officer. He was just great to work for. I went on the desk, let's see, not too long before the [1960] U.S. elections in which John Kennedy was elected President. I guess I went on the desk in July, 1960.

I remember the change in the way of doing things from the Eisenhower administration. If you did a memo for President Eisenhower for whatever reason, as I recall, it had to be on one page. No sooner did the Kennedy's get in than we would get requests to the effect of “Give me more. I want to know more about this sort of thing.” It was a great experience.

I think it was in April, 1961, that President Sukarno, or “Bung Karno,” as he was known in Indonesia, came to the U.S. to visit. We had asked in advance if any of the cabinet ministers who were accompanying him wanted to call on their counterparts in the States. No, we were told, there was no need for that. My boss went out to meet the plane, along with all of the other dignitaries. He called from the Mayflower Hotel, where Sukarno was staying, saying that now it turned out that the Indonesian Minister of Finance wanted to meet the Secretary of the Treasury, C. Douglas Dillon, and the Indonesian Attorney General would like to meet Bobby Kennedy, then Attorney General. “Fix it up,” he said. I called Secretary Dillon's office. His secretary had been with him at the Embassy in Paris, so I knew her casually, at least. But Douglas Dillon simply didn't have time for an appointment. Then I called Bobby Kennedy's office. He had a very nice secretary. I explained about the situation. She answered, “Well, sure, I think I can arrange that. Why not?” So she just did it. When the visit was over, I was sitting at my desk, “brown bagging” it at lunch one noon, and my secretary came in and said, “Mr. Linehan, the Attorney General is calling.” Bobby Kennedy said, “Well, I did meet with the Indonesian Attorney General, and he wants me to make a visit to Indonesia. Do you think that's a good idea?” He said, “I don't really want to go, but if it's a good idea, you ought to think about it.” I went into a brief discussion of how we had some problems. I said, “It's probably a good idea.” The next thing I knew, he made a trip around the world.

Q: A famous trip, particularly to Indonesia. What was the feeling that you were getting at the desk? I assume that Howard Jones was the Ambassador.

LINEHAN: Jones was indeed the Ambassador.

Q: Again, Howard Jones, in these oral histories I've been doing, is a controversial person. Could you tell me what you, as a new boy on the block, sitting on the Indonesian desk in 1960-1962 what sort of impressions you were getting about this, both within the Department and also from the field.

LINEHAN: Well, after reading the messages from the Embassy and finally meeting the man in person, I thought he was great. But I was taken with him, I guess. But there were a lot of people in the Department who did not think that he was great.

Q: He was a newspaperman who knew how to write.

LINEHAN: Yes, he did. He wrote very well. I really thought he was great. Not least of the considerations was that he wanted me to come out to Indonesia when I was available, when I finished my tour [in the Department]. He was definitely controversial.

Q: Well, were other people dealing with Indonesia saying, "Oh, my God, he's too close to Sukarno."

LINEHAN: And, "What's he done now?"

Q: Was that the sort of thing? Because there was a feeling that he would realize that Sukarno was playing with him, but Jones kept turning the other cheek.

LINEHAN: In part, sure. I think that part of my attitude was a reaction to the attitude of my colleagues on the Dutch desk. Because this was the period leading up to the West Irian crisis. They didn't think much of Howard Jones at all, and I got plenty of words from them about that. In fact, things came to a point where Ellsworth Bunker, as you may recall, was asked to come in on that matter. That was just before I left the Indonesian desk. But I did have a chance to meet him and was very impressed with him.

Q: What were some of the issues which you dealt with as the number two on the Indonesian desk?

LINEHAN: God, that's a long time ago. The West Irian crisis, of course, the question of what we sell to Indonesia in terms of armament and that sort of thing. We got involved a bit in that. We had a flyer who was in prison there, a fellow named Pope.

Q: This was part of a CIA effort earlier on to overthrow Sukarno, wasn't it? We had to live with this for some time. Well, then you left the [Indonesian] desk and went where?

LINEHAN: To Australia.

Q: This was from 1962 to 1967?

LINEHAN: Yes, because there was no appropriate position for me in Indonesia and none coming up soon. By that time I had three children, was living in suburbia, and didn't have much money. So, when Personnel asked me, “Would you be interested in being Consul in Adelaide, in South Australia?” I said, “Well, let me look it up because I don't know where it is. I want to think about it.” I looked it up and decided that it would not be bad. I was very eager to get overseas again...

Q: In those days wives usually didn't work in Washington. You didn't get a housing allowance in Washington but you did overseas. And the U.S. dollar went pretty far.

LINEHAN: The dollar went far indeed. In Australia, very much so. So, I said, “Yes, I'd like to be Consul in Adelaide.” I was the first in my [Foreign Service Institute] class to get my own post—a two man post with three Australian employees. I went to Adelaide in July, 1962. I hadn't realized that being American Consul in Adelaide, as it seemed to me afterwards, was akin to being American Ambassador in Transylvania in 1913. The manners and mores of South Australia at that time were quite Edwardian—and delightful. Adelaide was the only part of Australia settled by free settlers [i.e., not convicts expelled from England]. There was a certain sense of family and so on which wasn't quite the same in the other parts of Australia. Furthermore, the Consulate was 1,000 miles from the Embassy, and my consular district covered the Southern half of the Northern Territory, including the Alice Springs. I used to enjoy telling Texans that South Australia was only 100,000 square miles bigger than Texas. I think that most Texans didn't think that any state was bigger than Texas.

The Consulate had largely representational functions, and I was involved in a little bit of everything. I appeared on TV and radio programs, I opened shows, I crowned beauty queens, and I could do a 20-minute Rotary Club speech without looking at my watch. My wife spoke to every available women's group. As she said, they really never cared at all what she said, it was what she wore that counted. We really enjoyed Adelaide. It was a great, family place. A good office, excellent schools, and so forth. And the Australians are just terrific. It was the happiest post we had, I think. There were no major problems.

I had the luck of making a prediction in 1965 that the party in power in South Australia, the Liberal-Country League, was going to lose after 35 years in office. And they did. The Embassy thought that that was pretty neat. I had been asked to go to Adelaide by Bill Battle, a PT- 109 buddy of President Kennedy's who had been appointed Ambassador to Australia. He felt, probably with justice, that many of our consular posts in Australia had been filled with people who were about to retire. He wanted young people. So he filled Brisbane, Perth, and Adelaide with young people. I was the youngest of the lot. It was sort of fun being there, because Battle was a nice guy. He left Australia shortly after President Kennedy was assassinated and was replaced by a friend and business associate of President Johnson, Ed Clark, from East Texas. Clark rapidly became famous in Australia because he never was without a yellow rose of Texas in his buttonhole. He went to great lengths to make sure that he always had them available. Actually, a sharp, very nice guy. I liked him very much. To give you an example, President Johnson made the first visit ever of an American President to Australia in 1966. Ambassador Clark called me up and said, “Jack, you want to come up and help?” I said, “Oh, yes.” So he said, “Bring Jan [my wife], hear? Don't worry about money.” We went up to Canberra the day before the visit and stopped at the Ambassador's residence to see his wife and have a drink. When we were leaving, he said, “Y'all come for lunch tomorrow.” I said, “Mr. Ambassador, you've got the President coming tomorrow afternoon.” He said, “Yes, but not till after lunch.” So we went to lunch, and it turned out that it was in our honor. A dozen people were there. He visited us in Adelaide several times.

After that he came to Adelaide for the Festival of Arts, which is held every two years and is modeled on the Edinburgh Festival. They have had such participants as the London Symphony, the festival lasts for two weeks. Well, the Queen Mother was the patroness of the Festival, and she was coming for a visit that year [1966]. We arranged to get tickets to several things. The high point of the week was the Royal Australian Ballet performance for the Queen Mother. I got tickets, and it turned out that they were in the orchestra section. Well, anybody who was anybody in Adelaide sat in the Dress Circle. So I called the Lord Mayor, who was in charge of tickets, and said my tickets are for the orchestra. He answered, “Yes, I know, I put you there.” I said, “I've got my Ambassador coming” and so on and so forth. The Lord Mayor said, “I can assure you that you'll like the seats.” So we went, in full evening dress. Half way down the aisle a whole row of seats had been removed, and we were in the row directly in front of that. The Queen Mother and the Governor of South Australia, (a British lieutenant general), and his wife were sitting directly behind us. And at the first, as the British say, interval, the Governor said, “Oh, I say, John, do bring the Ambassador and Mrs. Clark up for a drink with Her Majesty.” So we exited with the royal procession. About a dozen of us gathered, had a drink and were presented. Actually, my wife and I had a very nice conversation with the Queen Mother, who wanted to know where we'd been, how many kids we had, how we liked the Australian people, and all that sort of thing. Very charming. Well, I got five gold stars for that episode from the Ambassador. He said afterwards, “Well, you know, Anne [Mrs. Clark] has never met a Queen.” I said, “Oh, really?” I didn't admit that I hadn't either.

Q: Did the Vietnam War intrude at all into...

LINEHAN: It did, indeed. In the earlier stage, that is, before the Australians became directly involved, in 1965 or 1966, some time around then, there was a lot of hullabaloo. There were some demonstrations. And we had one in front of the Consulate, where students at the university burned the American flag. Well, the Premier of the state personally called me to apologize. The Prime Minister of Australia denounced this in

Parliament in Canberra. The newspapers wrote that it was a terrible thing. The Vice-Chancellor of the University of Adelaide invited me to speak to the students. I had a vice-consul at the time who was as tall as I am, 6'4”—but much bigger, a football type. I took him along with me, and we spoke to an open air meeting of several thousand students. It went much better than I thought it would. We got some of what the Australians call “curly” [difficult] questions, but I think we handled it all right. That was during the days of my own innocence about Vietnam. I became disillusioned subsequently. Things got worse in Australia, after I left, particularly after the Australians sent troops to Vietnam.

Q: So you left Australia in about 1967?

LINEHAN: I left in early 1967. I was initially assigned as Political Counselor in Zaire. But when I returned to the U. S., the promotion list had come out, and one of the officers in the Political Section in Zaire was promoted. The Ambassador thought that he would prefer to have this person whom he knew as Political Counselor, which made sense. The officer who had been promoted, by the way, was Hank Cohen, more recently Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. I had known Hank in Paris, which was also his first post.

Instead the Department offered me the job of what was then called “supervisory political officer” in Monrovia. I went to do that job under Ambassador Ben Hill Brown.

Q: So you went to Monrovia. What were you doing there?

LINEHAN: I was senior political officer.

Q: What was the situation in Monrovia? We're talking about the period from 1967 to 1970. Not only Monrovia but Liberia as a whole.

LINEHAN: The situation was “status quo ante.” It had been the same for a long time. President Tubman was secure in his position, the country was peaceful, which is why now I feel so badly about Liberia. The Americo-Liberians were running the country. They were

corrupt, but life was peaceful. There was plenty of food. You know, what do you want? There was plenty of room for improvement—no two ways about that. But, compared to the situation now...

Q: We're talking about now...

LINEHAN: Inter-tribal warfare, savagery, just a terrible situation. People starving, and so on. If I may digress; at that time the American School in Monrovia had about 26 nationalities. They also gave scholarships to some tribal boys. Not that they were against girls, but the tribal people wouldn't let girls come down to Monrovia to go to school. They had discovered that the boys usually stayed with relatives, but they didn't have proper means of studying. They were used to the local custom of two meals a day, so at lunchtime they had nothing to do. The school asked for people in the community to look after these children. We took a young boy, Sam Fully, who was in the same class as my second son. I'd sign his report cards. He was in the house all the time and came to our children's birthday parties. My wife made his lunch every day—peanut butter and jelly, which was a little bit odd for an African boy, but he managed it. And we have stayed in touch with him over the years. He has done very well for himself in business. But, two or three years ago, after the troubles began, he and his family, his wife and his children, abandoned their suburban home and trekked through the woods to his native village to survive. They survived very poorly for the past two years. We heard nothing from him. Finally in 1992 he returned. His house was occupied by Sierra Leonean troops. There was nothing left in it, but the house itself was OK. We received a letter from him and sent him some money through the International Trust Company (Reston, VA) for which he worked. Then, in October or November of 1992 the rebels attacked Monrovia again. He had to abandon his house in the suburbs. When he went back this time, there was heavy destruction. He sent us pictures of the place. I mention this simply to illustrate what happened to a tribal boy who wasn't quite “upper class” and certainly not middle class. He

was doing very well—let's put it that way. He built a very attractive house. But he's lost it all. Now he's a refugee in Monrovia itself.

There was nothing of that apparent when I was there. The [CIA] Chief of Station, a new one, came in about 1969. He kept telling me, “Well, there's got to be some opposition. We'll have to track it down and find it—the people that are opposed to the president. There's some kind of underground going on around here.” But after he'd been there a year he came to me and said, “Jack, you know, I really don't think that there's any opposition here at all.” I thought, “That's what I've been telling you for a long time.” There was no opposition, per se, although there were a lot of people who weren't very happy with President Tubman.

Q: Then what would a political officer do there?

LINEHAN: Well, we were, at the time, much interested in youth. Do you remember that?

Q: Oh, yes. There were Youth Officers and all of that.

LINEHAN: They did have some unions. They had a labor union head. I was on good terms with him. There were lots of youth organizations and that sort of thing. I got to know some of the university professors, who were, in many cases, disgruntled but not in active opposition. That's it. It was not terribly exciting.

Q: Well, could you explain a little bit about how the Liberian power structure and society worked at that time?

LINEHAN: Yes. To go back a bit, when the slaves who returned to Africa from the U. S. were resettled in what became Liberia in the 1830's and 1840's, they introduced an element which was different from the natives, obviously. The families of these returned slaves had been in the States for quite some time, in many cases. Generally speaking, they had lighter colored skins than the local people. It's sort of the same type of thing

you found in Haiti, where the lighter skinned people dominated the very black population for years and years. So what you had was a nucleus of essentially foreigners who came and colonized this area and who were able to dominate all of the tribal people. They did, however, keep the peace amongst the tribes. They also had a curious way of spreading the “goodies,” so that what they ended up doing was co-opting people into so-called Americo-Liberian society. One of my friends, whom I haven't heard from for a long time now, was, when I went there, Under Secretary of State. Ernie Eastman was his name. In fact, he was a tribal boy with another name. He came in, got himself educated, and was co-opted into Americo-Liberian society. That was a pretty tight circle, dominated by President Tubman, who also, I have to add, was called the “Father of His Country.” And not without reason. There were many, many sprouts off the old tree that were produced during this period. But it was pretty much a tight knit circle which dominated not only the politics but the economy of the country. They made the arrangements with the various investors—always, I think, retaining a certain amount for themselves.

Liberia depended on rubber and iron ore. There were big rubber plantations carved out [of the jungle]. To a lesser extent the economy depended on diamonds. Now, they didn't produce many diamonds. The diamonds came filtering out of Sierra Leone and were sold through Liberia. The economy also depended on trees— lumber, another big factor. But these were all controlled directly or indirectly by the Americo-Liberians.

Q: What were American interests there?

LINEHAN: There were several American interests, aside from the economic interests, which were largely in rubber. Some of the mines had American investors, but there were also Germans. We had a USIS [Radio] Relay Station there. We had a big USIS establishment. We had a very large AID operation going. Subsequently, we had one of these very tall radio masts or antennas. It was about 1,000 feet tall. I think it had to do with naval navigation.

Q: Loran or something like that?

LINEHAN: No. Well, any way, we had our main station for area telecommunications, which basically was the telecommunications center for official U. S. communications throughout West Africa. So our interests were the USIS operation, the ATO [Area Telecommunications Office] operation, and the harbor, which we built during World War II for future reference. We put a lot of money into Liberia.

Q: Were we concerned at all about Soviet penetration or that type of thing?

LINEHAN: While we were there, the Soviets were not recognized and had no presence in Liberia. On one occasion the Soviets did send—and the president did accept—a variety show from Moscow, which included a great number called, “Hello Dolly.” But there was, I think, a Russian journalist present in Liberia. The Liberians, I think, wanted to stay on the good side of Uncle Sam and didn't want a Russian presence.

Q: Was your Ambassador Samuel Z. Westerfield?

LINEHAN: Actually, it was Ambassador Ben Hill Brown for the first two years. He had been consul general in Istanbul. He was in Liberia for three years. A taciturn man, whose wife liked to travel up country, and she made school uniforms for children. She got materials from the States, from the Carolinas. Ben Hill was from South Carolina. She and the Embassy wives made uniforms for school children. It was my understanding that all of the Embassy wives hated doing this. We arrived just before she and the Ambassador went on leave. When he came back, he announced that they were being divorced. So that was the end of the school uniforms. So the rest of the time he was there without a wife, and various wives filled in. We had a DCM. Then his wife left. So my wife filled in at various times. It was OK. He was a quiet man, a taciturn person. But I have to give him credit. We had a very large Mission—about 250 Americans, and a lot of Peace Corps volunteers beyond that. He said he wanted all of his officers to be sure to go to the Marine Guards'

“Happy Hour” at least once a month. He encouraged us to entertain people from the Area Telecommunications Office and to respond to any invitations we had from them. The ATO was composed of a large group of communicators who really had nothing to do with the local scene. They were just there. I thought it worked pretty well. He put himself out, in other words, to look after his people, in fact, and it was appreciated. He left in 1969 and was succeeded by Sam Westerfield. During the interval between them, I became charg# for the first time for a whole two weeks.

Q: So after that you came back to the States?

LINEHAN: I was assigned to the Air War College at Maxwell Field in Montgomery, Alabama.

Q: This was 1970-1971?

LINEHAN: It was from 1970 to 1971. It really seemed like another foreign country for us, in some respects. It was the second year of school integration.

Q: We're talking about black children attending school with white children.

LINEHAN: Yes, blacks and whites in the same school in Alabama. My oldest son was away at college, but my second son was in 9th grade, in high school. He went to Sydney Lanier High School, which was near us, but apparently one of the best. The only problem with all this was that they kept them on the run. There was very little time between classes. He used to complain that he didn't have any time to go to the bathroom, because they didn't want any fights. They figured that if they kept people moving in a hurry, they wouldn't have time to get into any trouble. My daughter, who was then in about 5th grade, I think, had much more trouble. She had attended school in Liberia, where many of her friends were black—there were all kinds of nationalities at her school. So she sort of assumed that some of the black girls would be friendly with her, but they weren't. I think we understand why. They weren't accustomed to this. She felt hurt about that. She found the adjustment

very difficult. She had a student teacher who was black and whom she liked very much. In effect, the principal teacher, who was white, didn't say it exactly in so many words. But what she was saying was, “Oh, you're a nigger lover.” That upset my daughter very much. So this was a tough year.

Q: This was still during the Vietnam War. We were beginning to withdraw, but it was still on. And there you were, from the State Department, down with a bunch of guys who had been fighting this war. How did they react to you and you to them?

LINEHAN: There were a number of civilians from other agencies as well, probably about 20 altogether, including two of us from State. I may add that, after we got there, everybody wore a name badge—except me. I guess they forgot, but there was never any problem because I was the only one with a beard in the place. It made me stand out. We were organized into seminar groups of about 12 or 15 members. And these were the people you were with most of the time. I certainly had no problem. We didn't always agree. But certainly we could have discussions. People like the Director of CIA, Richard Helms, came to speak to us. We had a lot of discussions. I found that most of the other students were reasonably, intellectually curious and weren't hung up on a “macho” outlook. So I made some good friends there, one of whom did very well afterwards in the Air Force. It was no problem, surely, but we had some fun discussions. And their feeling in a nutshell, I think I can say, was that the Department of State was always reactive, whereas the military always had contingency plans. I always used to twit them and say, “But you always have contingency plans for the wrong thing.” They would say, “Where's your contingency planning?” I would say, “Oh, we have them somewhere. We have a Policy Planning Staff.”

Q: Oh, I think they certainly have a point. I'm not sure that a plan makes any sense, anyway, in diplomacy, outside of thinking about the subject in general terms.

LINEHAN: I said, “We don't ever have enough people with time on their hands to do this kind of thing,” except for our Policy Planning Staff. I said that you have all of these military

people. They're not in Vietnam. They're waiting for a war. I thought that was a pretty good line.

Q: You came back to—you belonged to AF [Bureau of African Affairs] by that time.

LINEHAN: Not quite. I was assigned, in fact, to Personnel, handling assignments to the Senior Seminar and to the war colleges. The plan called “Diplomacy in the 70's” called for upgrading that office and providing training to more people. While I was in Washington I was dealing with the director of senior assignments, Cleo Noel, who was later, unfortunately, assassinated in Khartoum. He said, “As a matter of fact, we're not going to upgrade that office. So we're going to leave the people assigned to that office, and we'll find something for you to do.” So, for two weeks I didn't do much of anything. I was really miffed, to put it mildly, when a friend of mine, also in Personnel, said, “Hey, they're looking for a Deputy Director in Southern African Affairs, someone who's had experience in Black Africa. Do you want me to pass your name along?” I said, “Sure.” So the next thing I knew I had a call from the Director. We had a nice chat. He said, “Could you come to work this afternoon?” Cleo Noel insisted that I stay with him a couple of weeks. Then I very happily became Deputy Director of Southern African Affairs, which was an office covering not only South Africa but also Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, and Mozambique [then Portuguese possessions]. I worked for a fellow called Oliver S. Crosby, better known as “Mike.” We had a pretty large office. His first question was, “Do you want to be, as your predecessor was, Deputy Director and Officer in Charge of South African Affairs, or do you want to manage the Office?” I said, “Well, let me check around and see what other people do.” And I came back and said that I would really like to manage the Office. So that's what I did. He said, “You run the show, and we'll take it from there.”

The Office of Southern African Affairs was very, very busy, probably the busiest office in the Bureau of African Affairs at the time. We had a fellow named Charles Diggs, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, who kept us busy.

Q: A black Congressman?

LINEHAN: From Michigan, a mortician by trade, who was always after us to get this, that, and the other thing. He said he was going to hold some hearings on U.S. relationships with South Africa. He kept sending us long lists of questions. He wanted to know about everything. In fact, it was a year before these hearings came off. I think we did reasonably well. The Assistant Secretary of State at that time was David Newsom. My boss was away at the time, so I went to these hearings with Newsom. We were heavily involved with the Munitions Control people because, although we had an embargo on the sale of munitions and military equipment to South Africa, there are, as you are probably well aware, many things that fall into a so-called “gray area,” involving both the civilian and the military areas of activity. We had many, many debates as to whether this item should or shouldn't be approved [for export to South Africa]. We were also constantly engaged in differences with the Portuguese Desk about what to do regarding Angola and Mozambique.

I was asked if I would like to do an orientation trip right away or would I prefer to defer it. My feeling was that I really preferred to do it after my first six months, so that I would know by then what was going on. Finally, I did a six week trip, a magnificent orientation. I visited all of the areas. I think I met people of every shade of opinion and color in South Africa. Our posts made sure I met just about everybody. In Durban, for example, my wife and I were fellow house guests of the Consul General along with Gastha Buthelezi, political leader of the Zulus and his wife, Princess Irene.

Q: Ed Holmes...

LINEHAN: Ed Holmes was Consul General [in Durban]. I also went with his vice consul and spent an evening drinking beer with a fellow named Steve Bike, who was later murdered by the South African police. A wonderful person I certainly enjoyed meeting very much. But among the people I met in South Africa were Helen Suzman, the only opposition member at that time, [of Parliament], colored labor leaders, and ladies of the

Black Watch, who were running around and who protested in Johannesburg. I visited Soweto. I visited the two little areas outside of Durban...

Q: What was our policy toward South Africa? We're talking now of the period from 1971 to 1973. This was very much the "high Nixon" period.

LINEHAN: Yes, but the policy didn't change all that much. We had an arms embargo. We refused to sell arms. We were heavily criticized for continuing to maintain relations—cordial relations with South Africa. We did not permit any U.S. military people to visit South Africa.

I think that our relations were cordial but cool—that's the best way to put it. Nonetheless, there was great opposition from various segments of society [in the United States], including the academic and black communities, to our having really anything to do with South Africa. We were at the beginning of the period when pressure was being put on American business to withdraw [from South Africa] and what have you. And it was not too long after that Rev. Leon Sullivan organized a support group of business firms doing business there. But it was still a period when we maintained relations, basically normal relations. I found it fascinating.

Q: What were our interests in South Africa at the time—American interests?

LINEHAN: We had a lot of interests in terms of minerals—chrome, chromate, magnesium and that type of thing. There was South Africa's strategic location. That's about it.

Q: Did you get the feeling that Henry Kissinger, who was National Security Adviser, had a major influence on policy toward South Africa?

LINEHAN: Not at all. I think his orientation was toward other areas of the world. We dealt with people on the National Security Council staff, but there was no major pressure coming from his office.

Q: How about the argument that South Africa represents not just strategic location but a strategic force in case of Soviet domination elsewhere? Did that ever really become...

LINEHAN: I don't recall that at all.

Q: You then switched jobs a little later?

LINEHAN: Well, I was in that job for two years, and then the Director of Public Affairs of the Bureau of African Affairs left on assignment. And David Newsom asked me to do that job. And what was interesting in that position was that it wasn't only a question of dealing with the press, which I certainly did do. We had a guy in Congressional Relations who handled Africa. He was moved up to serve as a special assistant, I think, to the Deputy Secretary of State. And that job [in Congressional Relations] wasn't filled. There was a gap, and David Newsom wanted me to keep up ties with the Hill [Congress]. I did a lot of work on the Hill with Congressional staff members and so on, which I enjoyed very much. I acted to some degree as a go-between Newsom and various people on the Hill.

Q: What were the major points of concern on the Hill at that time?

LINEHAN: Well, there were major points, diametrically opposed. There were those conservatives who thought we should be doing more to assist the South Africans. And there were people on the other side, best exemplified by Charlie Diggs, I think. There were also some people—not all black, by any means, who thought that we really ought to do more to express our official disapproval of the system of apartheid. There were many active groups. I'm trying to think of specific instances which caused concern in this country, because even in my own church, which is Congregational and liberal, I got pretty sick of having to listen to people coming up and moaning about South Africa. And in addition to dealing with fellow church members, I had to do the same thing every day in the week. So there was that aspect, too. To an extent the Department was caught in the middle, as is often the case. What to do and what not to do. Maintaining cool but correct relations,

this was probably the best that we could do—go on with the arms embargo and hold down on official visits. There was a Congressman named Baumann, elected from the Eastern Shore of Maryland, who himself invited a [South African] general to come to the United States, which was, you know, no great help. He was a conservative and eventually was defeated a few years later.

Q: Well, did you go back to Africa again?

LINEHAN: Yes, among the things I did as the Director of Public Affairs in the Bureau of African Affairs was to talk to all new [American] ambassadors to African countries, in terms of policy, our press relations, etc. One of them happened to be a nice lady called Shirley Temple Black, who had been a famous child actress [and had been appointed Ambassador to Ghana]. When she came along, we had to arrange a press conference and get some film done by USIS. I spent a lot of time with her. A few months later she came back to the States. Her DCM was leaving. She called me up. I went to see her, and she said, “Would you be my DCM?” I said, “Love to.” Well, I discovered from the very beginning that she was a great person to be around and I enjoyed being with her. When I arrived [in Ghana], she said, “You're the pro. I want you to run the show. I want to know what's going on,” something which, evidently, my predecessor hadn't been too good about. I think he made a mistake in assuming that she'd been a famous actress but didn't, maybe, have much on her mind, shall we say.

Q: One only has to look at the child's star movies, and you know that you're talking about somebody with a high IQ or they wouldn't be putting...

LINEHAN: She's not an intellectual, by any means, but is very shrewd and sharp. Well, that was a job that I was happy to take. I could run the show and I believe that we had a very fine relationship. I am very fond of her. She's fond of me, and we got along very well. She was very good about taking advice. For example, when a problem came up, whatever

it might be, she would ask what I thought about it. I would give the standard reply: “This is the problem, these are the possibilities, and this is what I recommend.”

Q: What was the situation in Ghana at this time?

LINEHAN: It was a sad situation, in many respects. Ghana, as you know, became independent in 1957 with a parliamentary form of government under Kwame Nkrumah. He was overthrown by a military coup d'etat which worked out not too badly. I have to give the military credit for preparing for a return to a democratic form of government and elections. And this did take place. However, the democratic government was again overthrown by other military. When I was there, the government was run by the military. The head of state was Colonel Chumpong Acheampong. The cabinet ministers were primarily—though not all—military men.

The problem was, as the old adage goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. That's exactly what happened. The economy was really going down the drain. Ghana had been the largest producer of cocoa in the world, but in terms of the centralized-socialistic, if you will—type of economy set up, which the military still operated, the farmers were not paid sufficiently for their cocoa. And the currency began to slip, too. So what happened was that much of the cocoa went over the border to the Ivory Coast because the CFA franc [in use in the Ivory Coast and elsewhere in francophone Africa] was a hard currency. In addition to that, the military would take over the manufactured goods and itself take them over the border and sell them. There came a period when you could not buy matches, canned milk, canned fish, or batteries, all manufactured in Ghana. They were over the border. The minute you crossed the border into Togo, say, three hours away, there these items were on sale. But they were sold there because the CFA franc was hard. It got very bad while I was there, and after I left, far worse, to the point where the Embassy, I understand, used to send a truck over to Togo weekly to buy rice and staples for the Embassy Ghanaian staff.

Q: When you were there, what was it like, dealing with the Ghanaian Government?

LINEHAN: We dealt—at least the Ambassador and I did—primarily with the Foreign Ministry. And that was staffed by civilians. They were very cooperative. They'd been around a long time, they were pleasant, and we had no great problems. They, on the other hand, had to report to the military, so they didn't have total flexibility. I might add here that Ghanaians are known by some people as “the Latins of West Africa.” They are ebullient, hospitable, fun, wonderful to entertain. So we had very few problems dealing with them. We had some aid activity. We dealt with, again, a civilian economics minister. But there was always the heavy hand of the military.

Q: Didn't Kissinger plan a visit? Could you talk about that? Was Ed Holmes there at the time or no?

LINEHAN: I was. Ed followed me. Yes, I can indeed talk about that. Henry was going to make his first visit to Africa. The Ambassador was very insistent that she wanted him to come to Ghana. Now, I should say that, by contrast to many ambassadors who serve in countries which are not, shall we say, on the front burner, when she went to the States, she would say that she wanted to call on the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, of course, the NSC [National Security Council] chairman, and all of these people. I would say, “Gee, I don't know whether you will get these appointments. Well, look, we'll ask, anyway.” Well, she did, and everybody would see her. And, apparently, Henry was very fond of her. So she insisted that he come to Ghana, and he agreed. Having been through Presidential, Vice Presidential, and Secretary of State visits, I had no interest whatsoever in having one of these. But she insisted, and the Embassy was turned inside out. At 5:00 PM on the day before Kissinger was due to arrive at 10:00 AM, we were called to the Foreign Ministry. I went with her. They said, “Unfortunately, Colonel Acheampong, the head of state, is ill and cannot receive Mr. Kissinger. Therefore, it wouldn't be appropriate for him to come.” The real story was, apparently, that the Nigerians had sent a plane and a delegation to convince Acheampong not to receive Henry Kissinger because the Nigerians

were concerned about our involvement in Angola at that period. The fact of the matter was that the head of state did have a boil on his rear end, but I don't think it was all that serious.

We sent a “Flash” message to tell Kissinger that he could not come. He asked Ambassador Shirley Temple Black to meet him in Monrovia, which she did. She came back, three days later, with orders to return to the States. I was told that our relations would be cool. No signing of aid agreements, etc. So, she took off, and I was charg# d'affaires, basically for six months. She was permitted to return briefly for July 4, which was the bicentennial celebration [of the Declaration of Independence], and which was also her farewell. She left and became Chief of Protocol.

Perhaps at this point I should go back and tell you that when I arrived in Ghana, within two weeks something odd happened which raised my eyebrows. I looked into it a little bit more. I called the Regional Security Officer. We had turned up a “crook” who was the Embassy Administrative Counselor. Within three months I had to advise Ambassador Shirley Temple Black to call him in and tell him that she was sending him home, which she did. The Department invited him to retire, deciding not to prosecute him. What we could prove was enough to show that he was not doing his duty, but not enough to make it worthwhile to take him to court. Charlie Black, Shirley's husband, was rather suspicious of Foreign Service types. However, later on we became good friends after she sent the “crook” home. He felt that I was protecting his wife from embarrassment from dishonesty, and all that sort of thing.

I was charg# [in Ghana] until December [1976]. Well, how do you play things “cool”? I guess you do the best you can. I stayed on pretty good terms with the government. By September I was told, “You can warm up again.”

Q: Do you feel that anybody paid attention to our playing it cool or playing these games?

LINEHAN: No, it was a farce. But I don't think that too much damage was done, either.

Q: Did the Ghanaians know that we were doing this?

LINEHAN: No. I think it made Henry feel better.

Q: Well, what were we doing in Ghana? What were our AID, Peace Corps, and other activities at that time? Again, we're talking about the 1975-1977 period.

LINEHAN: We had a reasonably large AID operation there. We were doing such things as Family Planning, a lot of agricultural instruction, some medical training. Speaking of Family Planning, I might add that I had a visit from Congressman Scheuer of New York, who is a strong supporter of Family Planning. And fortunately for us, in Ghana the Ghanaians were very responsive to that. So we were able to set up a good program for him. I had him to lunch, along with the man in AID who had been handling this program. Congressman Scheuer said at lunch, “Well, now, when you see the head of state, do you discuss Family Planning with him every time?” And I replied, “Certainly not.” And the Congressman continued, “Well, you should.” The AID man concerned with the Family Planning spoke up and said, “Well, there's no need to because we get all of the cooperation we need.” But I thought to myself that it is sort of weird to ask whether I talk about Family Planning with the head of state. I thought, “Hell, on those rare occasions there are other things to talk about.”

We had a Peace Corps contingent of about 150, I think. A very large Peace Corps group. Heavily into teaching. And that, I found, was a problem—for me, at least. At one point, when I was charg#, the Peace Corps Director, a very good person, came to me with a new plan for the following year, providing for an increased number of teachers. I objected to that, because Ghanaian teachers were going over to Nigeria to teach because they weren't paid adequately [at home]. I said that I didn't see any point in our bringing in more teachers, just to fill the gaps. We ought to leave it to the Ghanaians to pay these people. So we changed the proposed Peace Corps plan.

Q: Did we have concerns about the role of the Soviets or the Chinese Communists at that time in Ghana?

LINEHAN: This was the period of “d#tente.” The Soviets at that time were being friendly. They invited us to movies, and our people played their people in volleyball—but it was all very superficial. On the face of it, everybody was good friends. But sure, we were much concerned about what they were doing in Ghana and what they were doing in all of Africa. It was the same old game—they said that they were competing, essentially. What they were competing in—and pretty successfully—all along the coast there were the fisheries. They were robbing the [local] fisheries blind. They had agreements with the host governments to help them to develop their fishing industries and so on. And meanwhile, of course, they had their big ships down there, taking loads of fish.

As for the Chinese Communists, we had not yet recognized the People's Republic...

Q: But we were beginning...

LINEHAN: We could be friendly at other people's parties. As a matter of fact, when my mother-in-law, who was in her 80's, came to visit us, the first party we took her to was one given by the Australians, I think, who had recognized the Chinese. I might add that she was a life-long Republican. I said to her, “You've heard about these Red Chinese Communists. Would you like to meet one?” She said, “Sure.” I took her over to meet the Chinese Ambassador, who was very pleasant. His interpreter, a young fellow, said to me, “How old would she be?” I said that she was about 81. The interpreter gave her a big bow. When we left, he came running over, wished her a happy day, and made another big bow. My mother-in-law said, “Well, these Chinese Communists aren't bad.” We didn't have much to do with the Chinese. They were not as active in Ghana as they were in other places, for reasons that I am not clear about.

Q: What was your impression of our aid program in Ghana?

LINEHAN: I have two concerns about our aid program. I think we try to do too much and go off in too many directions, in part responsive to people here in the U.S. Secondly, no matter how you put it, building something that people can see means a great deal, a point brought home to me subsequently by President Stevens in Sierra Leone. He said, “You're doing wonderful things.” We were doing some major agricultural training and so forth. He said, “You know, the Chinese come here and build a bridge and they're now building a stadium. I want something that I can point to and say to my people, 'That's American!'” You can argue this question back and forth, but he had a point. I felt that the program was much too diverse. We were putting bits of money here and there. I also found that dealing with AID—certainly when I was ambassador—was very awkward. For example, the CARE [Cooperative American Relief Everywhere] organization was building feeder roads very successfully. We certainly supported that—farm to market roads and that sort of thing. Well, one year—I've forgotten which year—the fiscal year had begun, but no money had come through [from AID] for the CARE organization to continue its road program. The money had been appropriated and was in the budget, but the money just didn't come through. I sent telegram after telegram to AID but no answer. Finally, the CARE guy came in and said, “Look, I simply can't maintain my organization any more. I have no money.” So I called my own office director [West African Affairs] in State and said that this is the situation, but AID is totally unresponsive. He said we'd have the money the following day. And so we did. I just didn't see the need for this kind of bureaucratic hangup.

I found also, when I was home on leave, that attending AID committee meetings was a dreadful experience. There were 25 people in one meeting which I went to where the chairman didn't know what it was all about. He found it very difficult to chair. I was pretty annoyed. In fact, I just left one such meeting. It was just a waste of time and a waste of talent. After 22 months, my shortest tour, I left Ghana for Sierra Leone.

Q: Could you talk about that? We might as well talk about that. How did you get that appointment?

LINEHAN: I've never quite known. I know that Shirley [Temple Black] was fond of me and I suspect that when she was back in the States, she said good things about me. But, of course, it was a different administration. I was appointed by President Jimmy Carter. All I know is that a new Ambassador came to Ghana in December [1976].

Q: That was Robert Smith?

LINEHAN: Robert State Smith—sorry, Robert Pretoria Smith.

Q: There were two Robert Smith's [as ambassador]. Robert P. and Robert S.

LINEHAN: We called one Robert State Smith because he was in the Department, at least initially. The other had been DCM in Pretoria. The latter was a good friend, and I was very pleased to see him. He came [to Ghana] in December [1976]. Along about March [1977] I went into the office one morning. My driver had a flat tire, so we were late. When I went into my office, my secretary said, “The Ambassador wants to see you right away.” The Ambassador gave me a telegram, which said, “The Secretary proposes to recommend that the President name you as Ambassador to Sierra Leone. Let us know if you agree.” I said [to Ambassador Smith], “What is this?” And he said, “Stupid ass! You're being offered an ambassadorship.” I thought about it for 30 minutes and said yes. It came totally out of the blue. And then it was another couple of months before any action [followed]. I should say that when Ambassador Smith came, he said, “Well, you've been running the show. Just keep on running the show.” Of course, it was inevitable that a career man will get his fingers in the pie. I was beginning to feel, not unhappy with him, per se, but, having been running the show, I felt that he didn't need me any more. I seriously thought that I would ask for a transfer. I do like Bob. He's a friend to this day. But he didn't need me. In turn, when I got to Sierra Leone, I had a DCM whom I did not know but who was recommended to me. He had been there with my predecessor, who was a political appointee and who gave him good marks. I told my DCM the same thing: “You've been running the show.

Continue on as before." Later, he said to me, "Jack, you want me to run the show, but you're doing things that I don't know about." And I said, "Mea culpa, mea culpa."

Q: What was the situation? You were in Sierra Leone from 1977 to 1980.

LINEHAN: Right.

Q: What was the situation there?

LINEHAN: Well, when I appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for confirmation, one of the Senators was interested in rumors that Sierra Leone was about to become a one-party state. It had inherited a parliamentary, democratic system from the British. What did I think about that? I said, "Well, I find it a little difficult to think about it because I haven't been there. But certainly, I will be interested in what does occur." He said, "Well, perhaps you'll come back and tell us about it." I said, "Sure," but I never did and he never asked.

The situation was one where the system inherited from the British wasn't working very well. As President Stevens told me later, "We've had no experience with it." And, as in many other African countries, the loyalty of the individual is first to his family and then to his tribe, the term "country" is something they don't even think about. It just doesn't exist. And there had been some very severe riots and clashes earlier, primarily between the Mende and Temne tribes. There had been a lot of shooting and, you know, that sort of thing. So President Stevens seemed to feel that with one party that was truly representative of the people would be better.

Q: This was President Siaka Stevens...

LINEHAN: Yes, he was known as "Pa Shaki." And so he did, in fact, achieve the change to a one-party state while I was there. Certainly, as an American, I certainly am all for

democracy, but when you don't know what it's all about, I'm not sure that it's necessarily the best way.

Q: Did we get involved in the protesting or anything like that?

LINEHAN: No. Sierra Leone wasn't of much interest to the United States.

Q: In fact, when you went out, did you get any instruction about what were American interests, or what to try to do, or anything like that?

LINEHAN: In terms of instructions from on high, not particularly. But I did go to meet Maurice Tempelsman—for diamonds are a big thing in Sierra Leone as well as Harry Winston before going to Freetown.

Q: These were diamond...

LINEHAN: Diamond merchants.

Q: Major figures.

LINEHAN: Yes, Harry gave me a huge stone—unfortunately of plastic, a replica of the "Star of Sierra Leone." He died subsequently. Maurice came out [to Sierra Leone] more than once. I saw him in Sierra Leone. He had very close ties with Tubman—I'm sorry, with Stevens. As an aside, he frequently escorts Jackie Onassis in New York.

There was a company in Sierra Leone in which Bethlehem Steel had a partial interest, which was dredging—I guess that was the word—for titanium. The operation had originally been started by Pittsburgh Plate Glass. They gave up, and then a couple of American companies, including Bethlehem Steel, got involved. And I think eventually that they gave up. When I was there, they had still to produce or make an economically viable situation there. [The operation] has since been taken over by another company, which is doing it

successfully. But it's an extremely complex process of production. Beyond that, there is very little American interest [in Sierra Leone].

Q: This is a former British territory. Did we leave it pretty much to the British? How did we play that?

LINEHAN: Not so much. The British, of course, were still prominent in terms of commerce—external commerce. There wasn't a spoken arrangement. On the other hand, we did there what we had done in Ghana and in Liberia. I met with the British Ambassador [in Sierra Leone] on a regular basis to share notes, ideas, and all that sort of thing. I had done that in Ghana and indeed in Liberia, but for different reasons.

Q: How did you find dealing with the government?

LINEHAN: It turned out fine. I had very good access, sometimes to the point of embarrassment. I remember that on one occasion I received a message from President Carter [for delivery to President Stevens]. I went over to the State House. My good German colleague had been waiting there for some time with a distinguished German visitor to see President Stevens. But President Stevens wanted to see me first, so it was a little embarrassing. I had no problem of access at all.

Q: How about the perennial issue, particularly with the smaller states—the UN votes?

LINEHAN: Oh, yes. We were always dilly-dallying about that. But primarily, I did that with the Foreign Minister. The President's interests were not in that particular area. Well, on some of the really big issues, he might get involved. But primarily it was with the Foreign Minister. He was a very capable young man who happened to live across the street from me.

Q: Were there any major problems? Was Libya mucking around there at that time?

LINEHAN: No. Libya was represented there, we had the two Korea's, and there were the Chinese [Communists]. I was there when we recognized [the People's Republic of] China, and they recognized us. This happened on January 1, 1978, as I recall. The very next morning I had a call from the Chinese Ambassador, who wanted to call on me because he had more recently newly arrived at the post than I. I decided for this occasion we would have some photos and champagne. It was no big deal. Then I arranged to call on him. One upmanship. I got a miniature Chinese meal with wine. It was very pleasant. His wife then called on my wife. We had met them maybe once, at a party. My wife nearly dropped dead, because in came this woman with a big hug and kiss, out of the blue! This was something we had never expected. So then we went through this diplomatic dance. I said that I wanted my wife to call on his wife. Well, the Chinese Embassy asked if they could call us back about that? I said, “Sure.” They called back and said, “Would we mind, instead of a call, if my wife and I and my deputy and his wife would come to lunch? We said, certainly. We didn't mind at all. We had a very nice lunch.

After the recognition the Chinese acted as if they had graduated, as if they had finally entered the big leagues. Then they started participating in all the regular things that everybody else in the diplomatic corps did, whereas before they had been very reclusive. It wasn't long before—every time I saw the Chinese Ambassador—there was an “abrazo.” I didn't know the Chinese went in for that sort of thing.

Q: Maybe they took courses.

LINEHAN: Maybe. Conversations were stilted, because of the interpreter. We never got far from “hegemony” and “the Great Bear,” and all of that jazz. It grew boring, after a bit. They were quite nice people, and when we left Sierra Leone, the Chinese Ambassador and his wife gave us a farewell dinner.

Q: What about “the Great Bear”—the Soviets?

LINEHAN: “The Great Bear” was represented in Sierra Leone by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, no less, who had been in Sierra Leone for seven years, when I arrived there. I don't know what he did to deserve that, but anyway he didn't speak any English—after seven years. A pretty poor performance. But by that time our exercise in detente had rather gone by the boards. We had rather cool relations.

Q: And particularly toward the end, there was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan...

LINEHAN: Which really stopped things cold. So we didn't see much of the Soviets, although their Embassy was just down the street from ours.

Q: You know, you talked a bit about our aid program there. Were there any programs which repeated your experiences in Ghana?

LINEHAN: To some degree. What had happened was that, some years previously—I can't remember when—there was the so-called “Korry Report” which looked at our aid operations in Africa and made recommendations that we concentrate our aid on countries that were important to us, either strategically or for whatever reason. Sierra Leone was not among them. So our aid ceased. My predecessor, Ambassador Mike Samuels, was a political appointee. He was a capable man. I believe that he was 35 when he was appointed. He did a very good job. I have to say that. He talked the Department into reconstituting the AID Mission. This time it was very small. We ended up with three people, plus two secretaries. What I found awkward was that we had no history of what had gone on before. I did know that we had put a lot of effort into the medical field, including a hospital. But it was gone! And nobody seemed to have good records available, which I thought would be extremely useful. So it was quite as if—and indeed we were—starting totally anew. The emphasis was primarily on agriculture. We were establishing an agricultural training operation in the Njala University up-country, which was very good. I went there to look at it.

What I did have was pressure from AID to take more people. So I said, “Well, what are they to do?” I was told, “We'll decide that after they get there. We'll see what programs can be done.” I said, “I'm not going to take anybody unless we have a program that they can be assigned to. I don't want them just laying around, looking for make work, or whatever you might want to call it.” And so I didn't take anybody. I was firm in telling people not to come. We didn't have a Marine Guard [detachment]. There was some talk about sending a Marine Guard force, but I said, “It's ridiculous.” You have to have, I think, a minimum of six [Marine Guards]. And, percentage-wise, they would be an enormous percentage of the Embassy, in a place where the threat was minimal. We had a lot of Lebanese there, and some of them were good Lebanese, or a lot of them were good Lebanese. I said, “I've got a lot of good friends in the Lebanese community. I'm pretty certain that if someone showed up who shouldn't be here, I would find out about it.” Inshallah! But I didn't see the need for it. The thought of coping with Marines in Freetown was depressing.

Q: You're talking about a group of basically young and partly teenagers...

LINEHAN: Yes, exactly. I had a lot of trouble with the Marine Guard detachment in Ghana, starting with when I first went there. Two black Marines came to see me. They were complaining about their “Gunny” and said that he was discriminating against them.

Q: The “Gunny” is a term for the Gunnery Sergeant, who is the detachment commander.

LINEHAN: He was from the South. I don't know how much truth there was to this complaint, except that I assume that Marines, who tend to be very much aware of authority, would not have come to me without reason. It took some, shall we say, concern on their part to come to see me. So I called the “Gunny” in and said that they've made this complaint. I said that I'm not interested in the details, but one more complaint and out you go. I wasn't fooling around. I had Marines getting into trouble all over the place. They're just so young. In Liberia most of them were Vietnam veterans. Those guys were grown and responsibly mature and good to have around. In Ghana we also had a “Gunny” who

was a wife-beater. His wife jumped out a window and broke her leg, at one point. That's no kind of example for young Marines. Another Marine was friendly with the lone enlisted man in our attach# office. Between the two of them they conspired to put some highly classified, military material in the consular office, in another building three miles away, apparently to cause trouble for the Defense attach#. They were discovered. The Marine confessed, and he was sent home. I don't know what happened to him. But the enlisted man in the attach# office was court-martialed. After this...We really had no need for Marines, I can assure you.

We also had problems...Can I talk about Station [CIA] personnel?

Q: Yes, why not? We can cut it out if you decide that you don't like it.

LINEHAN: I just wanted to say that we had had a Chief of Station [in Sierra Leone] some years before. He was PNGed [declared Persona Non Grata] for alleged involvement with an anti-government uprising, which had been a failure, and never replaced. We still had one communicator from the Station, and there was pressure on me to take a new Chief of Station. I said, “What for? What is he going to do here that is all that important?” I was successful in keeping all of them away, but my successor got them all!

Q: You left [Sierra Leone] in 1980?

LINEHAN: Just as a matter of interest I should say that, when the coup d'etat occurred in Liberia, when President Tolbert—who had succeeded Tubman and who, of course, I had known—was assassinated, communications between Liberia and the rest of the world were shut down. We, however, had our own communications. So, there I was in Sierra Leone, getting news by the hour from Liberia through the Embassy. I decided that I had better brief President Stevens on what was going on. This happened to be on a Saturday. I said that I was going to go down and see the President. My wife was very upset about this because she thought his people would have become very nervous at that point, and you never knew what would happen. I drove to his private house because my driver

hadn't arrived. I pulled up at the gate. The guard said, “Yes?” I said, “I'm the American Ambassador and I've come to see the President.” The guard said, “Oh, fine, come on in.” So I talked to President Stevens in his trophy room, I guess, where every gift he'd ever been given was on display. And, as always, he loved to talk. So here I went to see him about one thing, and we wound up talking about 25 other things as usual.

But in speaking of the Liberian coup d'etat he said, “That's too bad.” You know, there was a problem in Liberia about the vote. There were property qualifications for voting. He said, “But Sekou Toure [former President of Guinea] and I told Tubman, 'Give the people the vote.' You can fix the paper later,'” the paper being the constitution. We went on to talk about his desire to retire, which he did, finally (and died in his bed). He said, “You know, we have this problem with tribes here. I've tried to solve it, but it's a big problem. My own tribe, the Limba people...before I became president, they were very helpful. So when I became president they come to me and say they want this, they want that. So I told them, 'Fuck off.'” Then he said, “Oh, excuse me, Mr. Ambassador.” I said, “That's OK, Mr. President.” He was a down to earth type and a lot of fun, actually. Corrupt as all get out.

During my stay in Sierra Leone a man from the States arrived, representing companies which were concerned with waste disposal. Our understanding was that he had talked to President Stevens about, in effect, dumping waste materials in Sierra Leone. We had the impression that President Stevens had agreed to this. We reported this to the Department, and someone in the Department leaked it to the press. It made a big stink all over West Africa. The Nigerians and the Ghanaians got hot under the collar. Obviously, it was very embarrassing for Sierra Leone. I was instructed to call on President Stevens and explain to him that if he wished to do this, we would be happy to send some experts out to handle this disposal problem in the safest way possible. I called for an appointment with President Stevens. This time his office stalled me, and I didn't get the appointment for two weeks. It was the only time that happened. I don't know what went on but I had a pretty good idea that President Stevens did a lot of soul-searching. Finally, I was invited to call on him and he told me, in the presence of television cameras, that he certainly had never entertained

any idea of doing that, it was never going to be done, and on and on. I realized that I was part of a show for the public, and this was supposed to settle the issue, which it did.

Q: Well, then you came back to Washington and became an inspector. Is that right?

LINEHAN: I was a senior inspector for four years, which I enjoyed very much because it gave me a chance to see lots of places in the world. My wife likes to travel, so we did that together.

Q: Well, what was your impression of the value of inspections at that time? The role of inspections seems to keep changing. We're talking about the 1980 to 1984 period.

LINEHAN: Do you think that it keeps changing?

Q: My impression was that, at one time, the inspectors who came around were really helpful. Their efficiency reports, albeit superficial, could really be very useful. We really waited for those things. The inspectors now have a feeling that it is almost a more adversarial relationship. There is much more "looking at the books" and this type of thing. During the 1980 to 1984 period, I'm not sure how that fit in.

LINEHAN: You're right. I think that it was a period of change, in terms of inspections, to some degree. Basically, I don't think that inspections have changed that much, overall. But there is definitely a pronounced concern about money and all that type of thing. As far as efficiency reports are concerned, yes, they kept changing which ones you prepared. Certainly, the idea of doing an efficiency report for everybody had long since gone, thank God! I wouldn't want to have to do that now. But we did them for, I think, "entry level" people at the FSO-3 or FSO-2 level—or something like that. And then inspectors did make a private report to the Inspector General, giving their view of how the ambassador was doing his job. Now they do regular reports. They do fitness reports on the ambassador, the DCM's, consuls general, consuls, assistant secretaries, and deputy assistant secretaries.

When I became an inspector, we started hiring people from the General Accounting Office, primarily, but also from other “accounting” offices in the government. These people were not necessarily all accountants but were used to dealing with the use of money, the budgets, and this sort of thing. Generally speaking, they have done this with great success. A number of them have moved on to the administrative field and have become administrative counselors. They tended to be people who had some sense of adventure in them. They wanted to do more than just hang around Washington. This has worked out very well. I was very pleased with some of the people whom I dealt with. But the basic impetus was still what it was before, with those kinds of people looking into the administration and so on. The senior inspector is the more substantive type of inspector, still trying to figure out how you quantify political and economic reporting.

Q: Did you find any, what you might qualify as “horror stories”?

LINEHAN: No. What I will talk about and the thing I found interesting was that for “political” ambassadors the visit of inspectors was always a nervous time. The senior inspector often had to hold the “political” ambassador's hands and assure them that we were not there to do them in. I would not leave without telling the ambassador absolutely everything that I found. This seemed to work pretty well. On the other hand, with career ambassadors of all kinds, generally speaking they seemed to welcome the chance to talk with a senior inspector about things which they couldn't talk to anybody, at the post, including even their own deputies. This was a chance to speak freely, and that was very rewarding for me. That wasn't always the case. I inspected, you know, Ambassadors Harry Barnes, Mike Armacost, and all sorts of other people. They seemed to be pleased to have someone to be themselves with. That is the only way I can describe it.

Q: Then you retired in 1984?

LINEHAN: No, I did four years [as a senior inspector]. Nothing else seemed to be exciting. But in the meantime Ed Cronk, a man who had himself retired as an ambassador, had

been asked by the people on the Australian Desk to set up a foundation to organize our participation in the Australian Bicentennial celebrations, and they invited the United States officially to participate in theirs. The desk thought that if they could get an outside, non-profit foundation to do it, this would take the matter off their backs. So I was asked if I wanted to go on detail to help out, and I thought, “Why not?” It also gave me a chance to go to Australia again, where we had many friends.

So I joined Ed Cronk and became Executive Vice President of this American-Australian Bicentennial Foundation. Then I actually retired [from the Foreign Service] in 1986. At that point the job with the foundation became a salaried position. I think that the foundation worked quite successfully, in a small way. We raised about $3.0 million, in goods, services, and money. As I say, it gave us a chance to visit Australia once a year. So I was with that until we closed down the Foundation at the end of February, 1989. It had done its job, I think.

At that point I went back to the Inspector General and graciously offered my services. And much to my surprise, he said, “Yes, we could use you.” So, from 1989 until January, 1993, I did a couple of inspections a year, working about five months annually. These were so-called “security inspections,” primarily focusing on security with security people.

Q: You're really talking about attacks on Embassies and that sort of thing.

LINEHAN: Well, physical attacks, subversion, personnel, technical attack, and a whole realm of things. These teams consisted of people who had various kinds of expertise in these various aspects. Well, they needed an old hand to give them some help. And also to put the reports together, which I did. I went first to Havana where we have an interests office; I went to Brazil and Egypt. In the summer of 1991 I had the pleasure of going to Prague, where Shirley Temple Black was again serving as ambassador. Then to Romania, and this year to Germany, and China. Shirley's a good friend of mine. We don't correspond

—she doesn't write many letters, and neither do I. We see each other infrequently and are in contact by phone from time to time.

End of interview